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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court's interpretation of Idaho Code §

l 1(2)(a) resulted in incorrect

pretrial rulings, the admission of irrelevant evidence at trial, and erroneous instructions to the
jury. The district court erred, and ACHD should prevail in its appeal for the following four
reasons:
1.

The word construction in§ 7-711(2)(a) means "a thing constructed; a structure."

Severance damages, therefore do not include damage allegedly caused during the process of
construction. Brooke View's attempt to combine two discrete dictionary definitions of the same
word to gamer a more expansive reading of§ 7-711(2)(a) is contrary to applicable rules of
statutory interpretation and ignores a century's worth of this Court's case law addressing eminent
domain. Moreover, when due consideration is given to: (1) Idaho Code § § 7-712, 7-711 (3 );
(2) the on-point decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, including Oregon-Washington Railroad
& Navigation Co. v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 P. 1065 ( 1921) ("Campbell") and IdahoWestern Railway Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20

Idaho 568, 119 P. 60 (1911) ("Idaho-Western"); (3) the case law of other states with similar
constitutional provisions and eminent domain statutes; (4) this Court's Acarrequi jurisprudence;
(5) Idaho Code § 6-904(7); and (6) the practical considerations in future condemnation actions,
damages allowable under§ 7-711(2)(a) cannot include damage caused during the process of
construction.
2.

Even if the word "construction" was read to mean both "a thing constructed;

a structure" and "the process, art, or manner of constructing something," Brooke View's
argument still fails because severance damages are limited by two other key components of
Idaho's eminent domain statutes. Severance damages are (1) only available for what is
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summons."
These limitations, set forth in the plain language of§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712, prevent Brooke
View from recovering severance damage for the physical impact of acts that occurred during
construction. Brooke View's argument regarding the wisdom, justice, or policy of the plain
language of these statutes is not proper for consideration by the Court, as it raises questions for
the legislature alone.
3.

If Brooke View now contends that ACHD's Project plans, as proposed and

evaluated at the date of the summons, somehow support the jury's severance damage award, that
argument too must be rejected. Long-standing and well-settled Idaho case law provides that any
damage claimed under§ 7-711(2)(a) is only available if the condemnor could anticipate the
alleged damage at the date of the summons. See Campbell, 34 Idaho 601,202 P. 1065. The
record before this Court establishes that Brooke View's ultimate theory of the case (developed
years after construction was complete) was that "peak particle velocities from the vibration
during construction" caused damage to the walls. What the record also demonstrates is that
at the date of the summons, damage to the walls could not have been anticipated because ACHD
did not know the specific means and methods the contractor would use to build the Project,
including what type of equipment the contractor would use or where or in what manner
compaction activities would take place. Because of this, no one, including ACHD, could have
anticipated the damage claimed by Brooke View from: (I) the Project plans as proposed, and
(2) measured at the date of the summons. As argued by Brooke View, ACHD could have used
the very same Project plans, but its contractor could have performed the construction differently

1 The

roadway project at issue in this case is commonly referred to as the "Safe Routes to School
Project on South Curtis Road, ACHD Project No. 809028 ("Project"). The Project plans are
contained in the record at CR 1347-1372.
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no

at

to

concedes that the damage to the walls could not have been anticipated based on the Project plans
at the date of summons. Specifically, after Project construction was complete, and for months
and years thereafter, Brooke View's numerous experts could not articulate what caused the
complained-of damage to the walls. Therefore, as this Court said in Campbell, if ACHD is
"liable for such damages, they could be recovered only in a separate action." Campbell, 34
Idaho at 604-05, 202 P. at 1066.
4.

Finally, Brooke View erroneously asserts that "ACHD's interpretation would

leave owners with actual damage caused by a condemnor's construction activity with no legal
remedy by which to be made whole." Resp. Br. at 16-17. Brooke View's theory throughout this
case-during pre-trial, trial, post-trial and now on appeal-is that ACHD: (1) should have done
certain things relating to the Project that it did not do; and (2) should not have done other things,
in order to avoid damage to Brooke View's remainder property. Having presented a case based
upon the theory that ACHD's conduct was negligent, its recourse is through a separate action,
and Brooke View cannot inject its claimed damages into a condemnation proceeding.
In sum, Brooke View offers no reason for this Court to ignore the plain language of
§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712. And it offers no reason for this Court to nullify a century's worth of
eminent domain jurisprudence in this State. Because of this, ACHD is entitled to the relief that it
seeks through this appeal.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

WHEN APPROPRIATELY INTERPRETED, IDAHO CODE § 7-711 (2)(A) IS
UNAMBIGUOUS.

The principle issue on appeal is the appropriate statutory interpretation of the
unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(a). Brooke View begins its arguments on
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a repeated, and incorrect, assertion

§

l 1(2)(a) is

ambiguous. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 12, 14, 16. That is not, and has never been, ACHD's position.
ACHD has consistently maintained that this statute is unambiguous, because there is only one
reasonable way to read the provision.
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for determining the meaning of the statute is for
the Court to interpret the statute in order to determine and give effect to the plain meaning.
St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ofAda Cty., 146 Idaho 753,755,203 P.3d

683, 685 (2009). Such meaning is "derived from a reading of the whole act at issue." Id.; see
also State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015) ("This Court considers the statute as

a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings."). Applying these standard
rules, there is only one reasonable interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a): "damages caused during
construction are not recoverable as severance damages in a condemnation action." See Opening
Br. at 30.
In its Opening Brief, ACHD pointed out that the district court derived a second, though
erroneous, interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) based upon its narrow focus on a limited portion of the
statute-namely, the court concluded that severance damages in a condemnation action could
include damage caused during construction of a project, as determined after all construction is
compete and with years of hindsight analysis. See Opening Br.tit 29. While a statute is
considered ambiguous if the language is capable of more than one reasonable meaning, the
district court's interpretation is not reasonable because its conclusion is not supported by the
plain language of the statute, it is not supported by the eminent domain act, and it is inconsistent
with this Court's prior interpretations of§ 7-711(2)(a).
Because there is only one reasonable interpretation of the statute, it is not ambiguous and
no statutory construction of§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) is necessary. Brooke View's criticisms of ACHD's
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on

are

comments

the statutory construction

§ 7-711(2)(a) was contained in a footnote and was presented as an alternative argument in the
event the Court determined that the statute was ambiguous. As discussed in detail below, and as
set forth in ACHD's Opening Brief, even if statutory construction is appropriate, the proper
construction of the statute supports ACHD's position. See Section III.D., infra.
B.

BROOKE VIEW'S ARGUMENT THAT THE WORD "CONSTRUCTION" CARRIES
MORE THAN ONE MEANING AS USED IN§

7-711 MUST BE REJECTED-A

STATUTE AND THE WORDS WITHIN A STATUTE CAN HAVE BUT ONE MEANING.

Brooke View argues that the use of"; also" in the Merriam-Weber dictionary definition
of the word "construction" supports its argument that the word construction means at the same
time both "a thing constructed; a structure" and "the process, art, or manner of constructing
something." Resp. Br. at 15. 3 Brooke View misconstrues what"; also" means in the context of
a dictionary definition; therefore, its preferred interpretation is incorrect.

2

Despite its arguments of whether § 7-711 (2)(a) is being properly "interpreted" or "construed,"
Brooke View fails to note that the district court itself engaged in some construction of the
statute. For example, the district court relied on information beyond the plain reading of the
statute including her personal experience with the legislature:
And knowing the legislature the way I know it -- when I was doing
water law, I spent a lot of time looking at the constitutional
convention and looking at how they crafted statutes. And when it
comes to things like these eminent domain, as I said, they were
very concerned about the private property rights of the individual.
TT 181:23-182:5.
3

Merriam-Webster's definition of "construction" provides in relevant part, "2 a: the process, art,
or manner of constructing something; also: a thing constructed b : the construction industry
<working in construction> MERRIAM-WEBSTER Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/construction (cited in Resp. Br. at 15) (bold added by Brooke View).
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Merriam-Webster,4 ";

lS

a

relationship between different meanings of a word. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/help/explanatory-notes/dict-definitions (last
visited Sept. 9, 2016). A "sense" is "a meaning conveyed or intended: import, signification;
especially: one of a set of meanings a word or phrase may bear especially as segregated in a
dictionary entry." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.
com/dictionary/sense (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). Thus, the sense of "construction" as "the
process, art, or manner of constructing something" is different from, segregated from, and
divided from, the sense of"a thing constructed." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/construction (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
As two different and segregated senses, they constitute two different meanings of the same word.
The order of these different senses in a dictionary definition is not hierarchical, but merely
historical: "the sense known to have been first used in English is entered first." See MERRIAMWEBSTER Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/help/explanatory-notes/dietdefinitions (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
Given Merriam-Webster's explanation that"; also" is a sense divider, Brooke View's
claim that the word construction means at the same time both "the process, art, or manner of
constructing something" and "a thing constructed; a structure" is simply not supported by the
definitions it cites. Other dictionaries identify the same two competing definitions of the word
construction. See, e.g., DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse /construction

Reference to a dictionary definition is consistent with statutory interpretation of an
unambiguous statute. See, e.g., State v. Dugan, 157 Idaho 254, 255-56, 335 P.3d 594, 595-96
(Ct. App. 2014); State v. Allen, 148 Idaho 578, 580-81, 225 P.3d 1173, 1175-76 (Ct. App. 2009).

4
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Sept.

(the

can mean either "the act or art

or "something that is constructed; a structure"). 5
When there are competing definitions of a word in a statute, the Court must apply only
one definition. See, e.g., Ex Parte Moore, 38 Idaho 506, 514-15, 224 P. 662, 664-65 (1924)
(addressing numerous dictionary definitions of the word "sabotage" and concluding that the
Court had to choose one definition in interpreting the statute at issue); see City of Boise v. Planet
Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 56,878 P.2d 750, 755 (1994) (selecting only one of two dictionary
definitions of the term "personal injury"); State v. Brace, 49 Idaho 580, 583, 290 P. 722, 722
(1930), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156
(1937) (selecting one of several dictionary definitions of the term "customarily"); State v.
Ramirez, 33 Idaho 803, 814-15, 199 P. 376, 379-80, modified, 34 Idaho 623,203 P. 279 (1921)
(selecting one of several definitions of the term "execution"). This conclusion is compelled
because it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute can have only one
meaning." See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.
2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F .3d 504, 516
(9th Cir. 2012) (en bane); Rockwell Int'! Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 478,486 (1997),
ajf'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 147 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[S]tatutes can
have only one meaning and interpretation.").
Brooke View next sets out a false dichotomy arguing that ACHD claims that
"construction" means either "during construction or the completed construction." Resp. Br. at
15. See also Resp. Br. at 16 ("ACHD is saying that 'construction' must be segregated into
uncompleted construction activities and completed construction, in the form of improvements
5

ACHD identified these additional dictionary definitions in its Opening Brief at 29, and Brooke
View simply chose to ignore them.
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even though

statute on

lS

not ACHD's argument. ACHD does not segregate a single definition of the word construction
into two separate definitions. Instead, ACHD identified two different and competing definitions
of the same word, set forth in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, consisting of the physical acts of
construction versus something that is constructed; a structure. Depending upon which definition
the Court applies,§ 7-711(2)(a) either allows recovery of damage occurring during the process
of construction or for the improvement that is proposed to be constructed, but not both. See

Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1083; Rockwell, 37 Fed. Cl. at 486. As discussed below, the
only reasonable interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) is that damage caused during the process of
construction is not recoverable in a condemnation action.
C.

ACHD OFFERS THE ONLY REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF § 7-711(2)(A).

Brooke View claims that "ACHD's interpretation is not reasonable, and does not
consider the entire phrase 'construction of the improvement in the manner proposed."' Resp. Br.
at 14. Quite the contrary. ACHD's interpretation is the only interpretation that considers the
entire phrase "construction of the improvement in the manner proposed," applies the language
"at the date of the summons" contained in§ 7-712, is consistent with other portions of Idaho's
eminent domain statute including § 7-711 (3 ), and is supported by Idaho's eminent domain
precedent. See Mayflower Ins. Exchange v. Kosteriva, 84 Idaho 25, 30, 367 P.2d 572, 575
(1961) ("Words may in themselves be ambiguous, yet have a clear meaning when read in the

Brooke View's reliance on State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 3 P.3d 65 (Ct. App. 2000) is
misplaced. See Resp. Br. at 16-17. In that case the Idaho Court of Appeals was not presented
with the interpretation of a statute controlled by the definition of one of the words of the statute
as is the case here. Instead, all the court had to do was interpret the unambiguous language of
Idaho Code§ 37-2732B(c).
6
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context

Under a plain

construction is simply not an element of just compensation or statutory severance damage.
1.

ACHD's Interpretation Appropriately Gives Meaning To The Words
"The Construction Of The Improvement In The Manner Proposed By
The Plaintiff."

Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a) provides that "[i]fthe property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned,
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaint(ff." (Emphasis
added.) The statute does not end with the words "construction of the improvement." That
phrase is modified by "in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Likewise, the statute does not
say "in the manner constructed," "in the manner accomplished," or "in the manner completed"it says in the manner proposed. 7 Nowhere does it contemplate or allow damage alleged to be
caused during construction of an improvement. The statute's plain terms thus require an analysis
of the condemning authority's proposal.
Central to the issue of how the phrase "construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff' is to be interpreted is the Court's decision in Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho
568, 119 P. 60 (1911 ). In Idaho-Western, the Court squarely addressed the meaning of this
phrase and held that the provision refers to "the damage and injury that the particular
improvement or structure for which the condemnation is sought will cause to the remainder of

his property." Id. at 581, 199 P. at 64 (emphasis added). Consistent with this holding, the Court
held that "[t]he statute requires the condernnor to disclose the purpose for which he is seeking to
7

"Propose" is defined as "to plan or intend to do (something)." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER
Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/propose (last visited Sept. 9,
2016). The word "proposed" as used in§ 7-711(2)(a) therefore provides a temporal limitation to
the recovery of severance damages.
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conai~mn the property and

nature

or structure

expects to erect[.]" Id. at 581-82, 199 P. at 64 (emphasis added). The Court made no reference
to, and gave no consideration to, damages caused during construction as being a part of the
damages authorized by§ 7-711(2)(a).
Brooke View attempts to distance itself from Idaho-Western 's holding by overlaying
onto the Court's decision its preferred interpretation of§ 7-711. Resp. Br. at 21-22. In order to
do so, Brooke View omits significant portions of the Court's decision. Id. In particular, Brooke
View quotes only the sentence in which the Court states that important considerations under
§ 7-711 are "the use to which the property is to be applied, the nature of the improvement, and
the manner in which the improvement is to be made and the use carried on." Id. at 22 (quoting
Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 582, 199 P. at 64). Based upon its selective reading of the decision,

Brooke View attempts to impose its preferred interpretation concluding that the quoted language
"can only refer to the manner and method of construction" and therefore it must include damages
caused during construction. Id. Contrary to Brooke View's assertion, the Court in IdahoWestern made no such ruling.

When read in its entirety, the Court's interpretation of the phrase "construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed" looks to the "purposes" for which the property is being
condemned and "the general nature and character of the improvement" to be constructed-not
the physical act of constructing the improvement. Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 5 82, 199 P. at 64.
The phrase "the manner in which the improvement is to be made" cannot be read in a vacuum,
separate from the rest of the Court's holding that focuses on the purposes, nature, and character
of the improvement proposed. It also cannot be read to mean that damages occurring during
construction are recoverable, particularly when nothing else in Idaho-Western addresses the
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case. 8 Brooke
View's selective reading of a portion of the Idaho-Western decision-that ignores the facts and
the actual conclusions reached by the Court-must be rejected.
2.

ACHD's Interpretation Appropriately Gives Meaning To The Words
"At The Date of the Summons."

In addition to looking at the plain meaning of the statute, the rules of statutory
interpretation also require this Court to consider the plain meaning of§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) within the
entire context of Chapter 7, Title 7 of the Idaho Code. See St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 146 Idaho
at 755, 203 P.3d at 685. That analysis necessarily includes § 7-712-the statute which
immediately follows, and specifically refers to § 7-711.
Brooke View misconstrues§ 7-712 in an attempt to improperly expand the damages
available to a condemnee. First, Brooke View ignores the plain language of§ 7-712, and instead
advocates for a "same day" measure of damage without regard to the date of the summons.
Resp. Br. at 33-34. Next, unable to legitimately argue around the plain language of§ 7-712,
Brooke View concedes that severance damages must be "measured as of the date of summons."
Resp. Br. at 34. However, Brooke View then proceeds to argue that although § 7-712 requires
severance damages to be measured at the date of the summons, it does not require damages to
have "occurred as of the date of the summons" because that would be "ludicrous as it is not
possible in a direct condemnation case for any damages to have occurred as of the summons."
Id.9

8

Idaho-Western is not the only Idaho case with this interpretation and understanding of Idaho
Code§ 7-711 (2)(a). See Campbell, 34 Idaho at 605, 202 P. at 1066 (holding that damages that
accrue long after the date of summons are not recoverable in condemnation).
9

Brooke View selectively quotes a portion of IDJI2d 7.18 to suggest that damage caused after
the date of summons and during construction is relevant to severance damage under § 7-711.
Resp. Br. at 35. It also cites Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80 Idaho 105, 109, 326
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Brooke

ignores the express language

§

2. Section

12 states

unambiguous terms that a landowner's right to compensation and damages "shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the summons." The statute further states that "its actual value, at that

date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages
are allowed, as provided in the last section." Idaho Code§ 7-712 (emphasis added). The
statute's reference to "the last section" means§ 7-711, including its requirement that recoverable
damages are limited to those "which will accrue" to the remainder property because of the
"construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Idaho Code § 7711(2)(a) (emphasis added).
If any question remains that damages are to be assessed as of the date of the summons,

the next sentence of§ 7-712 resolves any pending doubt by stating "[n]o improvements put on
the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment
of compensation or damages." Id. The legislature, by including this language, clearly specified
that the focus of the entire damages inquiry is on what is proposed at the date of summons and
not on what is constructed or added as an improvement on the property afterwards.
Severance damages are those that "will accrue," measured "at the date of the summons"
from the "construction of the improvement in the manner proposed." Idaho Code§§ 7711(2)(a), 7-712; see Campbell, 34 Idaho at 605,202 P. at 1066 (rejecting a claim under

P.2d 388, 392 (1958), for the same proposition. Yet neither the pattern instruction nor the cited
case require a deviation from the plain language of the statute which requires an evaluation of the
project plans at the date of the summons. IDJI2d 7.18 (requiring that valuation of the property
being taken and damages to the remainder are "determined as of [date]"-meaning the date of
the summons); Waller, at 109-10, 326 P.2d at 390-91 (upholding trial court's jury instruction that
"fixed the accrual date of the damages as of the date of the summons").
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§

not

1

as

summons);

see also Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise City v. CB. Lauch Const. Co., 78 Idaho 485, 489, 305 P.2d
1077, 1079 (1957) (holding that § 7-712 "provides that the right shall be deemed to accrue at that
date 'for the purpose of assessing compensation and damages"'); Portneuf Irrigating Co v.

Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 128, 100 P. 1046, 1050 (1909) (noting that section 5221, which is an
earlier version of§ 7-712, provides "that the compensation to be assessed shall be fixed as of the
date of the issuance of the summons").
Brooke View takes the incredible position that ACHD never made this argument before
appeal, citing only a very selective portion of the Trial Transcript. Resp. Br. at 12-13 (citing TT
157:18-158). Brooke View conveniently omits portions of the Transcript that demonstrate that
the issue of whether a landowner can assert severance damages for what is proposed and not
what actually happens during construction was not only raised before the district court, but it was
discussed by both Brooke View's counsel and the district court. The court even noted its
disagreement with the argument.
[Brooke View's Counsel]: Under Mr. Gourley's interesting
interpretation that he put up here where proposed means what
they're going to do, but if they actually do it and it causes damage,
you don't get those damages, that's a stretch. There's no case that
says that. That is a novel interpretation.
THE COURT: Well, I think what he's saying is that you -- in
determining whether it's a severance damage due to the
construction, you look at the project as proposed to see if it would
have caused that. I'm not saying I agree with him. I'm just saying
that's what I understand his argument to be.
TT 94:24-95. 10 Given this exchange, it is entirely disingenuous for Brooke View to argue that
ACHD failed to raise this issue to the district court.
10

The district ruled that evidence concerning the physical acts of construction was admissible at
trial. See, e.g., CR 3281-84; TT 107, 168-69, 173-75, 187-89, 318-23. Given these rulings,
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Brooke View repeats

erroneous contention

no

argument regarding construction of§ 7-712 together with§ 7-711(2)(a) to the district court."
Resp. Br. at 31. 11 But the issue is not one of statutory construction, it is one of interpretation,
and§ 7-711(2)(a) cannot be properly interpreted in a vacuum separate and apart from§ 7-712.
See St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. And where, as here, the

district court's interpretation is incorrect, "neither the ends of judicial economy nor the ends of
justice would be well served by [the] acquiescence in the erroneous application of law." Ochoa
v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 118 Idaho 71, 79, 794 P.2d 1127, 1135 (1990) (Bistline, J.,

dissenting) (quoting Empire Life Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330,334 (5th Cir.
1972)). "Neither the parties nor the trial judge, by agreement or passivity, can force [an
appellate court] to abdicate [its] appellate responsibility." Id. at 80, 794 P .2d at 1136 (quoting
Empire Life Ins., 468 F.2d at 334).

Thus, even if ACHD did not raise this argument previously, which is not the case, this
Court "may exercise its discretion to consider a point for the first time on appeal where the point
involves a pure question of law determinable from uncontroverted facts." Id. at 78, 794 P.2d at
1134; see also WildWest Inst. v. Bull, 547 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing a limited
exception to the rule that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal when the issue "is
purely one of law and does not depend on the factual record below").

ACHD had to make no further objection to preserve the issue for appeal. See, e.g., Kirk v. Ford
Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 702, 116 P.3d 27, 32 (2005) (where "the trial court unqualifiedly
rules on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial no further objection is required to preserve the
issue for appeal.").
11

This is not a new issue. In fact, Brooke View clearly understood ACHD's argument and made
a point to cite to Idaho Code§ 7-712 in Defendant's Pretrial Memoranda and to discuss the
accrual date of severance damages. See CR 3722.
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ACHD's Interpretation
Of The Word

1(3)'s

Brooke View concedes that§ 7-71 l(a)(2) must be interpreted in light of§ 7-711(3).

See Resp. Br. at 17-18; 12 see also Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,631,269 P. 993,996 (1928)
("Another rule of interpretation is that other portions of the same act or section may be resorted
to as an aid to determine the sense in which a word, phrase, or clause is used, and such word,
phrase, or clause, repeatedly used in a statute, will be presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout the statute, unless there is something to show that there is another meaning intended,
such as a difference in subject-matter which might raise a different presumption.").
Brooke View then attempts to address the meaning of the word "construction" in
§ 7-711(3) of Idaho's eminent domain statute. Resp. Br. at 17-18. The weakness of its argument
demonstrates the weakness of its interpretation. Brooke View argues that the term
"construction" must refer to activities occurring during construction because those on-going
construction activities can have benefits to the remainder parcel. Id. The examples provided by
Brooke View include, "grading," "compaction," "overall topography," "re-routing of traffic,"
and "removal of toxic waste." Id. Yet, the benefits of each of Brooke View's examples are
derived from the proposed improvement and not the acts actually performed during
construction-and all of the activities described can be anticipated from project plans measured
at the date of the summons. If those items cannot be anticipated from the project plans, they are
not appropriately included as part of a severance damage claim under§ 7-711(2)(a) or a special
benefits analysis under§ 7-711(3). Thus, Brooke View's own proffered examples undermine its

12

Brooke View's positions are inconsistent in that it concedes that the Court should look at § 7711(3) in its interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a), but at the same time should ignore§ 7-712. Brooke
View cannot have it both ways and§ 7-711(2)(a) cannot be lawfully interpreted apart from§ 7712. See St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685.
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and provide further support

term

as

§ 7-711(3) and§ 7-7I 1(2)(a) means "a thing constructed; a structure."

4.

ACHD's Interpretation Is Consistent With Idaho Case Law.

As demonstrated by the case law set forth in ACHD's Opening Brief, Idaho Supreme
court jurisprudence over the last 100 years has repeatedly allowed severance damages for
"something that is constructed; a structure." See Opening Br. at 3 8-3 9 ( citing cases). In
response, Brooke View does not address any of these cases, nor does it attempt to distinguish this
significant, precedent-setting case law. 13 Instead, Brooke View makes the conclusory assertion
that if this Court adopts ACHD's position, there will be "a true departure from Idaho's existing
body of case law." Resp. Br. at 26. Yet Brooke View fails to cite any authority in support of
this statement, nor does it explain what "body of case law" will be overturned. See id. 14

It may be that Brooke View is referring to the three cases cited earlier in the same section
of its Response Brief where it makes the "true departure" argument-Palmer v. Highway District

No. 1 Bonner County, 49 Idaho 496,290 P. 393 (1930), State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho
269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958), and State ex rel. McKelvey v. Styner, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P.2d 699 (1937)

(cited in Resp. Br. at 25). Brooke View cites these cases for the proposition that "any facts
which bear on value may be considered by the jury in assessing damages." Resp. Br. at 25. If

13

In the same vein, Brooke View does not address ACHD's argument that the district court's
interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) would not only undermine Idaho's entire body of case law
governing severance damage awards, it would also undermine 30 years of this Court's rulings
on attorney fee awards in condemnation actions and make it virtually impossible for any
governmental agency to satisfy the standards set forth in Ada County Highway District v.
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and its progeny. See Opening Br. at 46-49.
Notably, Brooke View acknowledges that although other states have statutes with similar
language as § 7-711 (2)(a), there is a "dearth" of cases addressing, much less approving,
"damages caused during construction of the improvement." Resp. Br. at 21.
14
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lS

case

Brooke

because

the rule oflaw referenced by Brooke View was expressly rejected by this Court in State, Idaho
Transportation Board v. HI Boise, 153 Idaho 334,340,282 P.3d 595,601 (2012). There, the

Court held that the language cited by Brooke View-that damages in a condemnation case may
include "all inconveniences" caused to the remainder property-"is simply a loose and
somewhat misleading translation" of§ 7-711(2)(a). The Court then held that--contrary to
Brooke View's assertion-not "all inconveniences" may be considered by the jury, but only
those that are appropriate under Idaho law. 15 See id. (holding that as a matter of law, severance
damages were not available where access rights had merely been regulated, rather than
taken). Thus, Brooke View's argument is simply incorrect.
Brooke View next cites Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.
74, 75 (1914) and State Highway Commission v. Hooper, 259 Or. 555,560,488 P.2d 421,423
( 1971) for the proposition that just compensation is to be considered in terms of what the owner
has lost and not what the condemnor has gained. Resp. Br. at 17. From there Brooke View
argues that ACHD's reading of§ 7-711(2)(a) "defies common sense" and "ignores all the basic
principles underlying the meaning of just compensation." Id. Contrary to Brooke View's
suggestion, ACHD has never advocated that what it gained is in any way relevant to this case.
Therefore, these cases are inapplicable.
The primary basis for Brooke View's expansive interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a) is, in fact,
not based on Idaho law at all. Brooke View repeatedly claims that the purpose of just

The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in HI Boise specifically limited the prior ruling in
Fonburg. HI Boise, 153 Idaho at 340,282 P.3d at 601. However, it also limited the rulings
made in the other two cases cited by Brooke View, Palmer and Styner, because both cases
predate Fonburg. As such, Brooke View's reliance on these two cases is also misplaced.
15
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to

the property owner

as good a

as

would

been absent

the taking, and to ensure that no one citizen bears the burden of the public project more than
other citizens." Resp. Br. at 17 (citing United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624,
633 (1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,373 (1943)). However, this statement oflaw
is premised entirely on decisions of the United States Supreme Court under the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, and not on Idaho case law analyzing Idaho's constitution.
In Idaho, just compensation is not defined in the same manner as it is under the federal
constitution. Rather, just compensation under Idaho's constitution "is based on fair market
value, which is the price for which the property that is taken could be sold by an owner willing
to sell to a willing purchaser on the date of the taking." State, Dep 't o.fTransp. v. HJ Grathol,
153 Idaho 87, 92-93, 278 P.3d 957, 962-63 (2012) (citing Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Magwire,
104 Idaho 656, 658-59, 662 P.2d 237, 239-40 (1983)). Just compensation does not include
compensation for all injury or damage caused that would otherwise put the landowner back in
the position he would have been in absent the taking. See Opening Br. at 40-41 (detailing
numerous types of claimed damage that are not compensable in Idaho as matter of law). Thus, in
Idaho, where a landowner is not permitted to recover for all damages that may accrue as a result
of the taking, the amount of just compensation owed may not place the condemnee in "as good a
position as he would have been absent the taking."
This is not a novel concept, nor is it unique to Idaho. As stated in Nichols on Eminent
Domain:
A basic principle in valuing a taking is that the property owner is
entitled to "full and perfect equivalent" of the property taken. In
theory, this means the condemnor should leave the property owner
in as good a pecuniary position as he or she would have been if the
property had not been taken. Therefore, it would seem that the
property owner ought to receive compensation for any damages
inflicted by the taking. And, indeed, reported decisions in many
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jurisdictions offer these broad statements about making the
property owner "whole." In reality, however, various exceptions
to compensation exist for certain impacts, such that many property
owners do not receive compensation equivalent to the total value
of their loss.
4A-l 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.03 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). This is
the case in Idaho, and Brooke View's suggestion to the contrary is incorrect.

5.

Brooke View's Reliance On The Symms Case Is Entirely Misplaced.

In support of its argument that§ 7-711(2)(a) should be interpreted to include damages
caused during the physical construction of a project, Brooke View cites to State ex rel. Symms v.
Thirteenth Judicial District, 91 Idaho 237,419 P.2d 679 (1966), and it takes issue with ACHD

not citing the Symms case. Resp. Br. at 23. However, ACHD did not cite to the case it has no
bearing on the issues presented here. The Symms case simply held that allegations of damages
caused during construction raised material facts relating to issues framed in the complaint and
answer and therefore the State's demand for a jury trial was timely. Id. at 239-40, 419 P.2d at
681-82. The Supreme Court did not address the merits or test the legitimacy of the asserted
claims or defenses; it did not address the substantive issue of the landowners' damage claims;
and it did not conclude that landowners can recover in condemnation actions damages accruing
during the process of construction. In fact, the case contains no holding authorizing the recovery
of damages caused during construction and therefore fails to provide any meaningful support for
Brooke View's argument that such damages are compensable in a condemnation action.

6.

The Extra-Jurisdictional Cases Cited By Brooke View Are
Inapplicable and Do Not Support Brooke View's Expansive Reading
of§ 7-711(2)(a).

In support of its interpretation, Brooke View cites cases from several different
jurisdictions that have purportedly held that damages caused during construction of a public
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be recoverable

a condemnation action.

at 26-31,

All of the

cited cases are legally or factually distinguishable.
First, the Virginia, Illinois and Arkansas cases cited by Brooke View are legally
distinguishable because the constitutions from those states authorize a broader scope of damages
than are afforded under Idaho's more limited constitutional provision. See Resp. Br. at 30, 35
(discussing Tidewater Constr. Corp. v. Manly, 75 S.E.2d 500 (Va. 1953), Kane v. City of

Chicago, 64 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. 1945), Ark. La. Gas Co. v. McGaughey Bros., Inc., 468 S.W.2d 754
(Ark. 1971); Ark. State Highway Comm 'n v. Choate, 505 S.W.2d 731 (Ark.1974)). Each of
these jurisdictions permit just compensation awards when property is "taken" or "damaged,"
whereas Idaho's constitutional limits such awards to property "taken." Compare VA. CONST. art
I, § 11 ("No private property shall be damaged or taken for public use without just compensation
to the owner thereof') (emphasis added); ILL. CONST. art I,§ 15 ("Private property shall not be

taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law.") (emphasis
added); ARK. CONST. art II, § 22. ("private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged
for public use, without just compensation therefor.") (emphasis added), with IDAHO CONST. art I.,
§ 14 ("Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor.") (emphasis added); see
Opening Br. at 26-29. Indeed, in Idaho-Western, the Idaho Supreme Court, in its discussion of
the history of various states' constitutional eminent domain provisions, specifically identified
Virginia, Illinois, and Arkansas as being among those states whose "take or damage"
constitutions afforded greater damages than were available under Idaho's constitution. 16 20

Additionally, to the extent that Brooke View cites to Arkansas cases in support of its argument
that damages caused by construction activities occurring after the date of summons may be taken
into consideration in measuring severance damages (Resp. Br. at 35-36), its reliance on these
16
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at

, 119

at

as

to

understand or interpret Idaho's eminent domain law.
Like the Virginia, Illinois, and Arkansas cases, the Alaska and Montana cases referenced
by Brooke View, City ofAnchorage v. Scavenius, 539 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1975) and Montana

Railroad Co. v. Freeser, 29 Mont. 210, 74 P. 407 (Mont. 1903) are also legally distinguishable.
In its Opening Brief ACHD cited these cases-both from "take or damage" jurisdictions-to
demonstrate that even in jurisdictions with much broader constitutional provisions, damages
caused during construction are disallowed. 17 Brooke View cites these same cases to argue that
severance damages should be allowed for non-negligent activities which occur during
construction. Its reliance on Alaska and Montana case-with their broader constitutional
provisions- to expansively read§ 7-711(2)(a) should be rejected. There is nothing under Idaho
law to suggest that Idaho's limited "take" constitution would permit damages for activities
during construction whether from negligent or non-negligent conduct. And, in fact, the plain
language ofldaho's eminent domain statute and Idaho's case law leads to the contrary
conclusion. See Idaho Code§§ 7-711(2)(a), 7-712; Campbell, 34 Idaho at 605,202 P. at 1066;

Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 583-84, 119 P. at 65-66.
Brooke View's reliance on the Indiana cases of Elson v. City of Indianapolis, ex rel.

Dep 't of Redevelopment, 204 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ind. 1965) and State v. Heslar, 274 N.E.2d 261,

cases is equally misplaced. This Court has already considered, ruled on, and rejected, that
argument. Campbell, 34 Idaho at 605, 202 P. at 1066.
17

Alaska's constitution provides that "[p Jrivate property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." ALASKA CONST. art I, § 18 (emphasis added). Similarly,
Montana's constitution states that "[p ]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into
court for the owner. MONT. CONST. art II, § 29 (emphasis added).
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Elson is

1971),are

distinguishable on its facts because the court's decision did not address any claim for damage
caused by the construction of a project. Instead, the opinion addressed a landowners' claim for
lost profits-an issue wholly irrelevant to this case. Id. at 861-63. Additionally, Brooke View's
citation to Elson comes from a concurring opinion that addresses the history oflndiana's unique
damages statute. See Resp. Br. at 29 (quoting Elson, 204 N.E.2d at 864 (Achor, J.,
concurring)). 18 In short, when read in full, the concurrence explains that Indiana's statute is
particular in its history, context, and language and that as a result, it allows for damages "without
regard to whether any of [the landowner's] land was taken or not." Id. at 864. Thus, even
though the Indiana and Idaho's damage statutes share some of the same language, the significant
differences between the statutes limits, if not eliminates, any meaningful guidance that can be
drawn from the case. 19

7.

If the Court Considers Extra-Jurisdictional Authority, It Should
Consider Cases With A "Take" Only Constitutional Provision Like
The Hillsboro Case.

Instead of considering cases from around the country with "take" and "damage"
constitutional provisions, as Brooke View suggests, if the Court is inclined to look to extra18

Indiana's statute provides for four separate components of damages in a condemnation action.
The first is for the fair market value of the property taken. The second is for the value of the
improvements on the property. The third is for the damages caused to the remainder property
caused by the taking. And the fourth-which was a later amendment to the statute-is for
"[ s ]uch other damages, if any as will result to any persons or corporation from the construction
of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Elson, 204 N.E.2d at 864
(Anchor, J., concurring) (referencing Indiana's then version oflndiana Code§ 3-1706 (1946
Repl.), which is identical to current provision§ 32-24-1-9).
19

State v. Heslar, 274 N.E.2d at 261, cited by Brooke View, was decided after Elson, but is
similarly distinguishable based upon the specific statutory provision contained in Indiana's
eminent domain statute that is unlike Idaho's§ 7-711(2)(a) in background, framework, and
language.
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constitutional

from

provision should be considered. One such case briefed by both parties is Division of
Administration, State Department of Transportation v. Hillsboro Association, Inc., 286 So. 2d
578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See Opening Br. at 44; Resp. Br. at 28.
Brooke View attempts to distinguish Hillsboro on the grounds that: (1) Florida's eminent
domain statutes on damages do not contain the same language as Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(a);
(2) there was no competent evidence of causation in the case as between the damage and the
condemnor's construction; and (3) the holding in the case-that injury or damage from nonnegligent construction, properly performed was damnum absque injuria and not recoverable in a
condemnation action-is not applicable because it was based upon tort principles. Resp. Br. at
28-29. Brooke View's assertions are incorrect.
First, Brooke View is correct in its statement that Florida's eminent domain statute on
damages is different than Idaho's. But Florida's constitution contains a "take" only provision,
and Florida's enabling legislation is significantly broader than Idaho's allowing for the recovery
of"any damages to the remainder caused by the taking." FLA. CONST. art X, § 6; FLA. STAT.
ANN.§ 73.071(3)(b) (emphasis added). Yet, even with a similar constitutional provision and a
significantly more expansive statutory damages provision, Florida's appellate court still limited
the recoverable damages to exclude those damages caused "as a result of the manner in which
the construction is performed"-regardless of whether the construction was negligent or not.
Hillsboro, 286 So. 2d at 579. Contrary to Brooke View's suggestion, the differences between
Florida's and Idaho's statutes provide further support for ACHD's position, particularly when
coupled with the shared constitutional provision.
Second, while the Florida court did conclude that there was no competent evidence of
causation, the court made clear that its ruling did not "detract[] from our holding herein that such
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consequential damages to the remainder are not properly to be considered

an eminent domain

proceeding." Id. at 579. Therefore, Brooke View's causation argument is not a legitimate basis
for distinguishing the case.
Third, Brooke View is simply incorrect in suggesting that the Florida court's denial of
condemnation damages for non-negligent construction as damnum absque injuria was based
upon tort principles. Rather, the court's ruling was based upon a fundamental eminent domain
principle-that is similarly applied in Idaho-that damages in a condemnation action do not
include consequential damages, which are therefore considered damnum absque injuria. Id. at
579; see Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 584-85, 119 P. at 65 (1911) (holding that Idaho's
constitutional provisions on eminent domain do not provide for the award of consequential
damages); see State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487,515,346 P.2d 596,612
( 1959) (holding that injury sustained from actions that are not compensable in an eminent
domain proceeding-i.e., the requirement that utility facilities be relocated from with the public
right-of-way-are considered damnum absque injuria).
8.

Brooke View's Temporary Easement Argument Is Not Properly
Before The Court, Is Contrary To Idaho Law, And Is Not Supported
By The Cases It Cites.

Brooke View asserts that it is entitled to compensation for damage caused to the walls
during construction because the walls were partially within the temporary construction
easement. Resp. Br. at 31. Brooke View's argument is both curious and meritless because there
is no issue raised on appeal or in a cross-appeal by Brooke View as to the temporary construction
easement, its value, or the amount awarded by the jury for the easement. See CR 4889-90
(Special Jury Verdict awarding $676.50 for the temporary construction easement). Brooke
View's argument should therefore be rejected outright.
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to

argument and

cited case authority,

provide support for Brooke View's expansive reading of§ 7-711 (2)(a). The case of Matter of

Kadlec v. State of New York, makes no holding as to damages caused during construction. 264
A.D.2d 420, 420-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Rather, the case only concludes that all damages,
including consequential damages, are recoverable as a result of a temporary easement-a
holding which is contrary to Idaho eminent domain law which provides that consequential
damages are not recoverable. See Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 584, 119 P. at 65. Next, the case
of State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission v. Beseda, not only fails to
support Brooke View's argument but it actually supports ACHD's interpretation of§ 7711(2)(a). 892 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. 1994). Like the Campbell case, Beseda holds that temporary
easement damages are only recoverable if the acts "were not tortious and the damage could have
been reasonably anticipated" as of the date of the taking. Id. at 742. And where Brooke View's
damages could not reasonably have been anticipated, see Section III.F., infra, the case is
inapplicable. Finally, the case of Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Weaver, 310 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. 1984),
permitted damages caused during construction, however North Carolina's statutes on just
compensation is significantly broader than Idaho's§ 7-711 and specifically allows for damages
for " increases or decreases caused by the proposed project including any work to be performed
under an agreement between the parties." See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 40A-66. Thus, this case fails
to provide legitimate support for Brooke View's arguments.

D.

IF AMBIGUOUS, A STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF§ 7-711 REQUIRES
§§ 6-904(7) AND 7-711 To BE READ TOGETHER IN PAR/ MATER/A.

If the Court concludes that§ 7-711 is capable of two reasonable interpretations, the
construction of the statute, including reading other statutes addressing the same subject matter,
becomes applicable. See City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69,

- 25 -

905, 909 (2003); see also Planet

, 126 Idaho at

878

at 755 (concluding

that differing dictionary definitions rendered term ambiguous).
Brooke View first claims that§§ 6-904(7) and 7-711 do not have to be read in pari

materia because the provisions are in separate Titles and Chapters of the Idaho Code. Resp. Br.
at36-37. Thatisnotthelaw. See, e.g., Twayv. Williams, 81 Idaho 1, 7,336 P.2d 115,118
(1959) ("it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of the legislature, but
also acts passed at prior and subsequent sessions"). The standard instead is whether the two
statutory provisions relate to the same subject matter. City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69, 72
P.3d at 909. And here they do.
Both§§ 6-904(7) and 7-711 address plans for the construction of improvements-§ 7711 (2)(a) with regard to a governmental entity's proposed improvements and§ 6-904(7) with
regard to a governmental entity's plan or design for "highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other
public property." Compare Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(a) with § 6-904(7). Where, like here, one
statute is specific (§ 6-904(7) relating to "highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public
property") and the other statute is more general, the specific statute controls. See State v. Barnes,
133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290 (1999) (noting that "where two statutes appear to apply to the same
case or subject matter, the specific statute will control over the more general statute"). And
without regard to which statute controls, as enactments in pari materia, the statutes must be
interpreted in light of each other because they share a common subject matter.
Brooke View describes ACHD's argument as seeking "design immunity from damages
caused by construction of the project as designed, pursuant to the plans," and claims this
argument is new. Resp. Br. at 37. But as the record reflects, the argument is not new:

It is undisputed that Brooke View's claim for damage to the Walls
arises out of the plan or design of a construction or improvement to
the road adjacent to the Brooke View property. It is likewise

- 26 -

undisputed
constructed its improvement
plan or design prepared substantial conformance
engineering or design standards.

to a

See CR 1388 (Memorandum in Support of ACHD's Fourth Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion in Limine). ACHD made this argument to the district
court, preserving the issue for this Court's consideration.
Brooke View cites Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 178-79, 213 P .2d 911, 916-17
(1950), quoting the portion of the case that reads "[t]his provision of the Constitution, therefore,
waives the immunity of the State from suit." Resp. Br. at 38. 20 But as discussed in great detail
above, Idaho's Constitution is only self-executing as to the "taking of property"-not with regard
to severance damages, which are dependent on the statutory enactment. 21 As this Court has
recognized, "the Constitution of this state provides simply for the payment of 'a just
compensation' for the 'taking' of private property, and does not require the payment for damages
sustained." Idaho-Western, 20 Idaho at 583, 119 P. at 65. The Idaho-Western Court explained
that "the omission of the words 'or damaged' from the constitution does not prevent the
legislature from imposing a condition to that effect by statutory enactment." Id. at 585, 119 P.
at 65 (emphasis added). And, indeed, that is what the legislature did through the passage of
§ 7-711-it allowed a condemnee to recover only certain types of damage as specified by the
legislature.

Brooke View cites State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 943, 500 P.2d 841, 844
(1972) for the proposition that "[e]minent domain cases are inherently an exception to sovereign
immunity." Resp. Br. at 38. Seddon does not stand for that proposition. Instead, the case
addressed what issues are properly tried to a jury-noting that the only issue properly tried as a
jury issue is just compensation.
20

21

Brooke View claims that it is ACHD's obligation "to pay just compensation for property taken
or damaged pursuant to Idaho Constitution." Resp. Br. at 4 (citing art. I,§ 14). This is a blatant
misstatement ofldaho's Constitution. See Opening Br. at 26-29.
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because the present dispute

on the scope of damages

§ 7-711(2)(a)'s "as proposed" language, other statutes bearing on the same subject matter, like
§ 6-904(7), are relevant and must be read in harmony with§ 7-711(2)(a). Brooke View's
suggestion that the State has somehow entirely waived its limited right of sovereign immunity
afforded in the Tort Claims Act is directly contradicted by the Renninger case cited by Brooke
View. 70 Idaho at 181,213 P.2d at 918 ("A distinction, however, should be made between the
damaging of property and the actual taking, and courts have held that the immunity from suit of a
sovereign state cannot be circumvented by an eminent domain theory."). Because the question
before the Court is the scope of§§ 7-711(2)(a), this statute and 6-904(7) must be read in pari
materia before a determination can be made as to what is just compensation, what is tort, and

what is potentially subject to design immunity. Section 7-711 (2) is not a self-executing waiver
of immunity as Brooke View suggests.
The extra-jurisdictional cases cited by Brooke View suffer from a similar deficiency.
See Resp. Br. at 39, n.58. All of those cases stand for the proposition that a tort claim act cannot

abrogate a constitutional right to just compensation. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 123 P.2d 505, 513
(Cal. 1942) ("[T]he legislature by statutory enactment may not abrogate or deny a right granted
by the Constitution") (emphasis added). ACHD does not disagree with this concept, however,

none of the cases support the proposition that statutes addressing the same subject matter should
not be read in harmony with each other.
Brooke View's asserted right to severance damages does not arise from Idaho's
constitution, but instead from the language of§ 7-711(2)(a)-the same language that must be
read in pari materia with§ 6-904(7). And when § 7-711 (2)(a) and§ 6-904(7) are read together,
it becomes clear that the legislature did not intend to allow recovery in a condemnation action for
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out

to a plan or design

substantial conformance with engineering and design standards.
E.

EVEN IF THE WORD CONSTRUCTION As USED IN§ 7-711(2)(A) COULD
CONTEMPORANEOUSLY CARRY Two DEFINITIONS AND MEAN Two DIFFERENT
THINGS, BROOKE VIEW'S SEVERANCE DAMAGE CLAIM STILL FAILS UNDER
THE PLAIN MEANING OF IDAHO'S EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE.

Whatever definition the Court decides to apply to the word construction must be read in
the context of"in the manner proposed" and "at the date of the summons." See Idaho Code §§ 7711(2)(a) and 7-712. Said another way, regardless whether the word means the physical acts of
construction, the improvement that is constructed, or whether it somehow means both things at
the same time-as suggested by Brooke View-under the plain wording of§§ 7-711(2)(a) and
7-712, the determining fact is what is proposed at the date of the summons. Contrary to Brooke
View's assertion, what actually transpired during construction cannot give rise to a claim of
severance damages under§ 7-711(2)(a).
Brooke View is not subtle in its position-it openly requests the Court ignore the plain
language ofldaho Code§§ 7-711 (2)(a) and 7-712. First, Brooke View acknowledges Idaho's
eminent domain statute, codified in 1881, stating exactly what the plain language requires: "[ a]s
no improvements could ever have been constructed by any condemnor [by the date of the
summons], damages would have to be assessed based merely on what is proposed without
consideration of any construction actually undertaken or completed." Resp. Br. at 32 (emphasis
in original). Unsatisfied with the plain language, and claiming that the statute "ignore[s] reality,"
Brooke View asks the Court to look beyond what was "proposed" and beyond the "date of the
summons," to what was actually carried out during the process of construction, in hindsight.
Brooke View relies on the enactment of the so called "quick take" statute (Idaho Code
§ 7-721) to support its position. But what Brooke View actually requests is that the Court usurp
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Resp. Br. at

function and rewrite§§ 7-111

Brooke View

is correct that prior to the enactment of§ 7-721 condemnors could commence construction of the
improvement on the land to be acquired only by agreement or by the appointment of
commissioners and a preliminary assessment of just compensation pursuant to § 7-717. Thus, as
acknowledged by Brooke View, prior to the enactment of§ 7-721 and consistent with the plain
language of§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712, "[j]ust compensation was assessed with damages based
on the project plans" without regard to the "actual impacts of the take and the construction of the
improvement on the remaining property." Resp. Br. at 32.
What is significant about the addition of§ 7-721 to the statutory scheme in 1969-and
what is glossed over by Brooke View-is that the legislature did nothing to modify the language
of§§ 7-711 (2)(a) or 7-712 to allow any consideration of the actual impacts of construction.
Instead, the language "as proposed" and "at the date of the summons" remained intact within
§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712. So while, after the 1969 statutory amendments, a condemnor may
gain possession of property before the just compensation is determined, severance damage, if
any, has always been measured, and remains measured, as of the date of the summons and based
on the project plans without regard to any actual impact of the take. This includes whatever
actual impacts construction activities may, or may not, actually have on the remaining property.
Ignoring the language of the statutes, Brooke View resorts to arguing that valuing just
compensation as of the date of the summons and on the project plans is "not ideal because both
parties in such a case are making a 'best guess' as to damages which will be sustained as they
value the property, which is inferior to an actual assessment based on known conditions, which
can occur only after the condemnor completes construction." Id. at 33. However, the question
of whether it is "ideal" to comply with the legislative requirements of§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712
or whether it is "inferior" to some other measure of just compensation desired by Brooke View is
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not

has repeatedly said over

past 50

years, that determination is for the legislature not the Court. 22 See, e.g., Wright v. Ada Cty., 160
Idaho 491,498,376 P.3d 58, 65 (2016) ("The wisdom,justice, policy, or expediency of a statute
are questions for the legislature alone.") (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d
1010, 1013 (1962)); see also Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556,576, 155
P.680, 687 (1916) ("The procedure ... to ascertain the compensation and to make the right of
eminent domain available, has been fully provided by the legislature"); Portneuf Irrigating Co.,
16 Idaho at 127, 100 P. at 1050 (1909) (noting that Idaho's Constitution says that just
compensation shall be determined "in a manner prescribed by law" and stating that the
Legislature has prescribed that method in Section 5226, which is an earlier, identical version of
§ 7-711 ).
F.

ACHD COULD NOT ANTICIPATE DAMAGE To THE WALLS DUE To PEAK
PARTICLE VELOCITIES FROM VIBRATION DURING CONSTRUCTION FROM THE
PROJECT PLANS AT THE DATE

OF THE SUMMONS.

Campbell stands for the unmistakable proposition that for a severance damage claim to
exist under§ 7-711(2)(a), damages must have been anticipated from the project plans at the date
of the summons. Campbell, 34 Idaho at 605,202 P. at 1066. Brooke View's attempt to
distinguish this case is entirely unpersuasive. Resp. Br. at 24 (citing Campbell, 34 Idaho 601,
202 P. 1065 (1921)). According to Brooke View, Campbell should be disregarded because:
(1) the damages occurred outside of the area of the take, (2) the damages were along the lines of
a tort, because no condemnor would propose construction that would poison a stream, and (3) the
22

Without citation, Brooke View opines that it is typical for condemnors and condemnees to
ignore the plain language of§§ 7-711 (2)(a) and 7-712 and to instead measure just compensation
only after construction has been completed. Resp. Br. at 33. Even if this unsupported
supposition were true, what condemnors and condemnees do by agreement in other cases is not
relevant here. It is the legislature's role to create the law, not the parties. Wright, 160 Idaho at
498, 376 P.3d at 65. The plain language of§§ 7-711(2)(a) and 7-712 must control.
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stream was not foreseeable. Resp. Br. at 24. These

bases for distinguishing

Campbell are either incorrect or are inapplicable.
Brooke View's first purported distinction, that the damage occurred outside of the area of
the actual take, is the very definition of severance damages. See Idaho Code§ 7-711 (2)(a). As
ACHD has already explained, not all damages are compensable under Idaho law. See Section

III.CA., supra. This attempt at distinction is no distinction at all.
Next, Brook View's suggestion that Campbell is distinguishable because no condemnor
would intentionally propose a project that would poison a landowner's stream is not a basis to
distinguish Campbell, but instead draws a direct parallel to this case. Just as no condemnor
would propose to construct a project that would poison a water source, no condemnor would
propose to engage in construction activities that will cause physical property damage to the
remainder property. Stated otherwise, just as in Campbell, ACHD did not propose a project that
would result in physical damage to Brooke View's walls, and Brooke View's attempt to
distinguish Campbell for this reason is also without any merit.
Finally, after its first two futile efforts to distinguish Campbell, and conceding the reality
of Idaho's eminent domain statutory framework-that the claimed damage must be anticipated
from the project plans at the date of summons-Brooke View next asserts that as of the date of
the summons it was "easy to anticipate" that vibrations from construction would cause structural
damage to the walls. Resp. Br. at 24. Brooke View's bare assertion is factually unsupportable
because as of the date of the summons no one knew what equipment was going to be used by the
contractor or where, when, and how much compaction was going to take place. 23 To be sure,

23

Brooke View's experts opined that damage could have been avoided by selecting other
equipment or using alternative ways to operate the equipment. See, e.g., TT 989-90, 998-99,
1003-04, 1584-85, 1710-11, 1721, 1745-46, 1809-11, 1965-66. This testimony establishes that
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the date

the summons and long after completion of construction, not even Brooke

View's experts had a settled theory concerning what caused damage to the walls. And Brooke
View's experts had the benefit of hindsight. This is confirmed over and over in the record.
•

Resp. Br. at 6-addressing the period ohime after construction and conceding "Brooke
View did not have experts at that point who identified the exact mechanism of how the
walls were damaged during the construction project, although vibration during
construction and/or excavation, settlement, and loss of lateral support were all
suspected";

•

Resp. Br. at 6-"[T]here was not enough data to determine the actual cause at that
point. "; 24

•

CR 194-months after construction was complete, on May 28, 2013, David O'Day
opined "[t]hough I cannot at the moment identify a mechanism that will likely or
definitely damage the subject wall, similarly, I cannot conclusively rule out all such
mechanisms that could damage the wall";

•

CR 3490--four months later, David O'Day had narrowed his conclusion to two potential
causes of damage to the walls: expansion of soil beneath the walls caused by moisture
from the infiltration trench, or vibration during construction. Mr. O'Day could not
determine which of these actually damaged the walls. See also CR 1776. It was not until
a year later, on September 30, 2014, that Mr. O'Day eliminated expansive soil as a
potential cause of damage. CR 1798;

•

CR 1840--Brian Smith submitted an affidavit on January 2, 2015 stating that "there is
not a way, based on the information available, to specifically allocate what percentage of
damage was caused by compaction vs. excavation, or what particular percentage of
damage was caused by each machine on the job";

•

CR 1973-Dr. Paul Michaels identified five potential causes of damage in September
2014, including excavation, introduction of subsurface materials, replacement of soil, soil
improvement by vibratory compaction, and laying new pavement. This opinion relied on
a list of equipment actually used, as well as weather phenomena. CR 197 4, 1987.

the Project could have been constructed consistent with the Project plans without damaging the
walls, which further supports ACHD's position that the damage could not have been anticipated.
Brooke View contends that "[t]he fact ACHD did not actually anticipate the damage (despite
being warned by the property owner) doesn't mean it was not foreseeable as of the date of the
summons." Resp. Br. at 25. But Brooke View cannot have it both ways. Brooke View admits
that after construction and after years of hindsight review by its experts there was not enough
data to determine a cause. Thus, it must also necessarily follow that there was also insufficient
data, at the date of the summons, to anticipate the same.
24

- 33 -

These record citations demonstrate Brooke View's acknowledgement

not only was

the claimed damage not "easy to anticipate," it could not have been anticipated from ACHD's
Project plans at the date of the summons. Further, Brooke View admits on appeal that "[t]he
makes and models of the equipment and when and where used, were established through the
daily photographs Ms. Miller took" during construction-not from the Project plans. Resp. Br.
at 8. And Brooke View further concedes that "[s]oil data from ACHD's soil test of 2013 was
used as a component of vibration analysis"-tests conducted a year after construction was
complete. Id. at 8-9. Only then did Brooke View's geophysicist, "using the specifics of the
machines, their locations, and the specifics of the soils for the site," opine that "vibrations
generated during construction far exceeded known thresholds for causing damage to structures."
Id. at 9.

All of this information-the makes and models of the equipment to be used, when,
where, and how the equipment was to be used, and the specifics of the soils for the site-was not
available to ACHD at the date of the summons. See Resp. Br. at 3 ("ACHD did not specify any
particular equipment for the contractor to use on the project."). 25 Indeed, Brooke View's counsel
stated it very clearly in her closing argument at trial: "the evidence is that starting in June of
2013 vibration was identified as a potential cause." TT 4145:9-11. That date is a year after the
25

Alta Construction was ACHD's general contractor for the Curtis Sidewalk Project. TT
940:10-12. ACHD's contract with Alta Construction was a means and methods contract
meaning that it was up to Alta Construction to determine what equipment to use, how to use the
equipment, and when to use the equipment. As Brooke View's own witnesses testified, with a
means and methods contract "the designer does not specify what we call means and methods.
In other words, doesn't say get a machine this big and go hit the dirt six times with that. That's
usually left to the contractor." TT 1588:4-8. Alta Construction, not ACHD, chose the
equipment to be used and Alta Construction decided to run one or more than one piece of
equipment at a time. See TT 984:21-23.
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summons. Brooke

hindsight analysis-that could not have existed at the

of the summons-is inappropriate to support a severance damage claim.
G.

BROOKE VIEW HAS A REMEDY-IT JUST FAILED To PURSUE IT To DATE.

Brooke View asserts that because there is no evidence of negligence in the record,
"ACHD's interpretation would leave owners with actual damage caused by a condemnor's
construction activity with no legal remedy by which to be made whole." Resp. Br. at 16-17.
This argument misstates the factual record and is contrary to established Idaho law. See
Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 P. 1065. In Campbell, the Court addressed a factually similar

scenario and held that an owner's remedy is to bring "a separate action." Id. at 65, 202 P.2d at
1066.
ACHD does not use the adjective "grossly" lightly. Here, however, there is no doubt that
Brooke View has grossly misrepresented the record. Brooke View repeatedly claims that "[t]he
record is absolutely devoid of any evidence of negligence." Resp. Br. at 18-19; see also at I
("with no allegation or evidence whatsoever of negligence" and "no evidence of negligence"), at
19 ("No evidence at trial was offered by either side to show any negligence"), at 20-21 ("there is
no evidence of negligence in this case."), at 24 ("In this case, there is no tort"), at 26 ("absent
negligence"), at 2 7 ("there was no allegation of evidence of negligence" and "[ t]he drain and
sidewalks were all installed in a perfectly normal, appropriate manner."), at 28 ("There was no
improper construction"), at 46 ("There was no evidence of negligence"). But, out of the other
side of its mouth, Brooke View has always argued, to the district court, the jury, and now to this
Court, that ACHD engaged in negligent conduct that breached duties to Brooke View. 26 Below
26

Brooke View further contradicts itself in its Response Brief by simultaneously stating that
ACHD did not breach any duties. Resp. Br. at 4 ("ACHD actually had no duty to do any of these
things."), at 5 (" ACHD was under no duty to keep any particular records .... "), at 19 ("[T]here is
no legal duty of ACHD which has been breached."), at 19 ("[T]his case cannot possibly be a

- 35 -

are a few examples of Brooke View's statements, testimony, and arguments,

a more

complete list contained in Addendum A.

Examples of Brook View's statements before trial:
•

"ACHD did not do much analysis prior to construction regarding soils in the area."
CR407.

•

"ACHD did not install any devices prior to construction which would have measured
movement or settlement of the soils." CR 407.

•

"If ACHD wanted to ensure they did not damage the wall during construction there are
steps they could have taken, but they did not." CR 408.

•

ACHD "did nothing to monitor its construction activities to ensure the wall was not
damaged or even to document the condition of the wall prior to construction." CR 723.

Examples of Testimony at Trial:
•

ACHD did not have any records "that they had done any kind of analysis on the
potential impact of the walls on the storm drain facility." TT 830:22-831: I (expert Joe
Canning).

•

ACHD could have moved its Project farther from the walls and "something could have
been mitigated much more easily." TT 1897 (expert Patrick Dobie).

•

Brooke View's walls should have been identified as a concern by ACHD before the
Project construction. TT 1944 (expert Patrick Dobie).

•

ACHD could "have gone back and looked at the wall on a regular basis any time they
wanted." TT 1945 (expert Patrick Dobie).

Examples of Argument at Trial:
•

As to compaction Brooke View's counsel argued "I don't believe they were doing it
right." TT 4150:3-4.

•

ACHD "could have taken soil samples from the property." TT 4044:24.

negligence case."), at 19 ("The plans for the improvement project were designed according to
standards, and the contractor followed the plans."), at 27 ("No duty to Brooke View was
breached.").
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•

ACHD "could have followed the AASHTO guidelines and done a on!-ci~m~.u
survey to document the conditions before the project,
wall. TT 4044:25-4044:1-4.

•

ACHD "could have taken photographs." TT 4045:4.

Examples of Brooke View's Statements Post-trial:
•

"ACHD could have, and should have, done a pre-construction survey and considered
moving the storm drain and not compacting the sidewalks to be installed (flowable
backfill doesn't require compaction)." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have considered the applicable National Transportation guidelines and
AASHTO guidelines regarding anticipated vibration from construction." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have taken soil samples." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have kept construction logs." CR 5063.

On appeal, Brooke View Continues to Assert ACHD's Failures:
•

"[T]ypically storm drains are ten feet from anything with a structural foundation."
Resp. Br. at 2.

•

"The problem is that they were installed so close to existing structures (the walls) that
those nearby structures were physically damaged." Id. at 27.

•

"No one from ACHD ever inspected the walls or performed any kind of preconstruction
survey prior to the lawsuit, prior to construction, or even during construction of the
project." Id. at 3.

•

"ACHD did not do any soil tests adjacent to Brooke View prior to construction."
Id. at 3.
Abraham Lincoln reportedly asked, "If you call a dog's tail a leg, how many legs does a

dog have?" His answer was, "Four. Calling a dog's tail a leg does not make it a leg." Alexander
v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 998 (9th Cir. 2014) (S. Trott, J.,
concurring). The same is true here. That Brooke View asserts that it did not make allegations or
present evidence or argument of negligence does not make those statements true. With Brooke
View's overabundance of allegations, evidence, and argument regarding what ACHD did not do
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or

it could have or should have done, Brooke

s

sound

tort. 27 As such

Brooke View's remedy lies in "a separate action." See Campbell, 34 Idaho 605,202 P. at 1066.
H.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND
ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRED THE JURY TO CONSIDER ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION
ACTIVITIES

Brooke View's attempts to justify the district court's erroneous jury instructions actually
support ACHD's arguments that the district court erred, as a matter oflaw, in its interpretation of
Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a) and the damages and evidence allowed in a condemnation action.
Instruction No. 15 includes extraneous language that forced the jury to consider damages
caused during the act of construction. This instruction, like Instruction No. 20, uses the unique
phrase "construction of the improvement project." CR 4906, 4911. Contrary to Brooke View's
assertions, that description is not found in any pattern jury instruction or in Idaho Code§ 7711(2)(a). See Resp. Br. at 42-43. Combined with the district court's other instructions
regarding the acts of construction, Instruction No. 15 improperly focused the jury's attention on
the acts of construction rather than the improvement that existed when construction was
complete and shifted the jury's focus away from the date of the summons to completion of the
Project.
Brooke View's argument that ACHD created the need for Instruction Nos. 20, 24, and
2728 is misleading and misses the point entirely. Each of those instructions was brought about
27

Brooke View's pervasive assertions about what ACHD could have or should have done with
respect to the Project should have been addressed as part of the prerequisite element of necessity
for maintaining a condemnation action. See Idaho Code§§ 7-704(2). In the present case, the
issue of necessity was determined long in the Court's Order for Possession of Real Property
dated August 23, 2012. See CR 91.
28

ACHD objected to Instruction No. 27 during the jury instruction conference. TT 3998-4000.
The basis for this objection is quite clear from ACHD's briefing on its Fourth Motion for
Summary Judgment. CR 1373-91, 2458-67. This is the only objection required to preserve this
issue for appeal. Although ACHD did not object to the district court's characterization of the
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district court's erroneous interpretation of the damages
condemnation action. 29 Brooke View's case was all about acts of construction and these
instructions effectively eliminated the long-standing rule that condemnation damages are
measured as of the date of the summons, before any acts of construction have taken place.
See Section III.C.2., supra.

The district court also misstated the law when it relieved Brooke View of any obligation
to prove causation and put full responsibility on ACHD for every person, activity, or event
related to the Project. CR 4911 (Instruction No. 20), 4918 (Instruction No. 27). Brooke View
claims that its burden to prove general causation was consistent with Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(a).
Resp. Br. at 43. And in the very next sentence, Brooke View confirms ACHD's objection to
Instruction No. 20, using the theory of res ipsa loquitur to justify the lack of a causation
requirement. Id. ("It seemed obvious that since the walls were not damaged prior to the project
and were clearly damaged after the Project (with cracks appearing during), the damage was
caused by ACHD."). Brooke View also argues that "ACHD had zero evidence of any other
cause of the damage to the walls." Resp. Br. at 46. ACHD had relevant evidence to put to the
jury as to causation, but it was precluded from offering or relying on the evidence. By way of

law in response to jury question 53, the court's view of the law on this issue was quite clear from
the Order on Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. CR 3282-83. ACHD
acknowledged that the court had made a final decision on the issue, but it did not express
agreement with the court's view of the law. See TT 3344-45.
Brooke View also criticizes ACHD's failure to object to the district court's pre-trial rulings
regarding proximate cause and ACHD's responsibility for the work perfonned by United Water/
Owyhee Construction. Resp. Br. at 45, 57. Both of these rulings appeared in the district court's
Order on Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. CR 3282-83. It is wellsettled that an appeal may not be taken from an order denying a motion for summary judgment.
Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539,542, 164 P.3d 819, 822 (2007). Brooke View's criticism is
unfounded and illogical.
29
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examples, ACHD had evidence that

a

s owner,

Miller, knew of the

first crack in the walls very early in the construction, but specifically kept that fact from ACHD.
See TT 3141; 3274-75. Yet the district court did not allow ACHD to put that evidence on and
specifically instructed the jury "[t]here has been evidence Brooke View did not notify ACHD at
the time it claims it discovered cracks on its walls on or about November I , 2012. This issue has
been the subject of prior rulings by this Court and the Court ruled that this fact has no relevancy
to any issue to be decided by you. Therefore, you are instructed that you are not to consider this
fact in arriving at your decision or to discuss it in deliberations." See CR 4915.
ACHD also had evidence that its contractor, Alta Construction, picked the compaction
equipment that was to be used and then decided when and how many times to hit the ground.
See TT 940: 10-12; 984:21-23; 1588. Nonetheless, the district court precluded ACHD from
putting on this evidence and instructed the jury as follows: "[f]or purposes of your decision you
are to assume ACHD is responsible for all construction work performed as part of the Curtis
Road Project." CR 4918 (Instruction No. 27); see also TT 3347: 10-13 ("This is ACHD's project
and it is legally responsible for its project. So any questions relating to responsibility are not
relevant."). These rulings unfairly left the jury with only one party to blame-ACHD.
These incorrect statements of law prejudiced ACHD by focusing the jury's attention on
irrelevant evidence and allowing the jury to award noncompensable damages.

I.

ACHD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS
REASONABLE COSTS BOTH BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AND ON APPEAL.

Considering the amount of just compensation awarded by the jury--excluding the
improper damages allowed by the district court's erroneous interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a)ACHD made a number of offers that specifically satisfy the requirements of Ada County
Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), overruled in part by State,
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1

Idaho

278

Because

court also erred when it failed to conclude that ACHD was the prevailing party.
ACHD requests the Court reverse the district court's prevailing party determination and
attorney fee award and remand the matter to the district court with instructions to enter an order
that ACHD is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to an award of its reasonable costs.
Moreover, and for the same reasons, ACHD is the prevailing party on appeal and is entitled to an
award of its costs on appeal.
J.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS SHOULD BE
REVERSED.

Because of the its erroneous interpretation of§ 7-711(2)(a), and for the other reasons set
forth in ACHD's Opening Brief, the district court's award of discretionary costs should be
reversed in its entirety. Alternatively and specifically as to ACHD's request with regard to the
duplicative award of $32,319.96, Brooke View's only challenge is that ACHD failed to raise this
issue to the district court either through a motion for reconsideration or a motion to amend the
judgment. Resp. Br. at 64. Brooke View cites no authority or case law in support of this
misguided argument. While ACHD certainly could have filed either of the motions Brooke
View identified, it was not required to do so in order to preserve this issue for appeal. See In re

Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750,758,339 P.3d 1154, 1162 (2014).
ACHD timely objected to Brooke View's memorandum of costs and it raised a specific
objection to the costs claimed for John Roters. CR 6056-98; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5).
Under these circumstances, ACHD properly preserved its objection to Brooke View's claim for
discretionary costs. Accordingly, even if the Court affirms the district court as to all other issues
on appeal, at the very least, the award of discretionary costs should be reduced by $32,319.96.
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CONCLUSION
all of the reasons set forth in ACHD's Opening Brief and this Reply, ACHD
respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment entered by the district court and remand this
case with instructions to enter judgment in Brooke View's favor in the amount of $8,512.32 as
just compensation for the taking of its Property. ACHD further requests this Court vacate the
district court's judgment as to fees and costs and direct the district court on remand to make a
finding that ACHD is the prevailing party and entitled to its reasonable costs. Finally, ACHD is
entitled to its costs on appeal before this Court.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.
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ADDENDUM A

Examples of Brooke View's Statements, Testimony and Arguments
Relating to ACHD's Negligent Conduct

Examples of Brook View's Statements Before Trial:

•

"ACHD did not do much analysis prior to construction regarding soils in the area."
CR407.

•

"ACHD did not install any devices prior to construction which would have measured
movement or settlement of the soils." CR 407.

•

"If ACHD wanted to ensure they did not damage the wall during construction there are
steps they could have taken, but they did not." CR 408.

•

ACHD "did nothing to monitor its construction activities to ensure the wall was not
damaged or even to document the condition of the wall prior to construction." CR 723.

•

ACHD failed "to document what was actually done during the project (i.e. incomplete
construction logs, no monitoring of vibration, no compaction logs from the area of the
subject property, no documentation of equipment used or where it was used or when,
etc.)" CR 2186.

•

ACHD did "no proper pre-construction survey work and [made] no documentation of
what was done, where, when, with what and by whom during [the] construction
project[]." CR 2187.

Examples of Testimony at Trial:

•

ACHD did not have any records "that they had done any kind of analysis on the
potential impact of the walls on the storm drain facility." TT 830:22-831 :1 (expert Joe
Canning).

•

ACHD could have moved its Project farther from the walls and "something could have
been mitigated much more easily." TT 1897 (expert Patrick Dobie).

•

Brooke View's walls should have been identified as a concern by ACHD before the
Project construction. TT 1944 (expert Patrick Dobie).

•

ACHD could "have gone back and looked at the wall on a regular basis any time they
wanted." TT 1945 (expert Patrick Dobie).
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the construction farther away
,, ...-,-,e,,,-1_, (expert Dr. Paul Michaels).

a

•

ACHD should have obtained soil samples prior to beginning construction. TT 1580
(expert David O'Day).

•

ACHD should have met national standards for pre-construction testing, should have
monitored the vibration in the walls during construction, and could have dug a trench to
prevent vibrations from reaching the walls. TT 1584-85 (expert David O'Day).

•

ACHD should have moved the location of the infiltration trench. TT 1586 (expert
David O'Day).

•

ACHD should have done additional preconstruction testing - "a test pit" or measuring
how vibrations travel in the ground. TT 1809-11 (expert David O'Day responding to
jury instruction).

•

ACHD should have followed standard specifications "prepared by American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials" and conducted a
preconstruction survey. TT 1811-12 (expert David O'Day responding to jury question).

•

"And so I certainly think that the damage that was done to the wall could have been
avoided by some pre-construction testing." TT 1812 (expert David O'Day responding
to jury question).

Examples of Argument at Trial:

•

As to compaction Brooke View's counsel argued "I don't believe they were doing it
right." TT 4150:3-4.

•

ACHD "could have taken soil samples from the property." TT 4044:24.

•

ACHD "could have followed the AASHTO guidelines and done a pre-construction
survey to document the conditions before the project, including the condition of the
wall." TT 4044:25-4044: 1-4.

•

ACHD "could have taken photographs." TT 4045:4.

•

ACHD "could have obtained information on how the wall was constructed."
TT 4045:4-6.

•

ACHD "could have done some computations or analysis." TT 4045:6-7.

•

ACHD "could have followed the transportation guidelines which were available to
estimate the impact of construction vibrations." TT 4045:8-10.
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•

"There's tables, published tables, from the Federal Transit Authority that they could
have used to make that estimation."
4045: I 15.

•

ACHD "could have moved the storm drain to another location." TT 4045: 16-17.

•

ACHD "could have used flowable backfill which doesn't require compaction for the
sidewalk so that they weren't compacting right next to the wall." TT 4045:17-20.

•

ACHD "could have noted on the project plans to retain and protect the wall to put the
contractors on notice that there was something there of concern." TT 4045:21-25.

•

ACHD "could have done mitigation to stop vibrations by digging a mitigation trench
between the excavation and the wall." TT 4045:25-4046:2.

•

ACHD "They could have specified the use of smaller equipment." TT 4046:4-5.

•

ACHD "could have done vibration monitoring, which is very common on projects."
TT 4046:5-6.

•

ACHD "could have done regular inspection for damage before and during
construction." TT 4046:8-9.

•

ACHD is the "one[] with the obligation to take action to protect private property. And
if they don't take action, they have the obligation to pay for any damage that results."
TT 4046:12-15.

•

"If [ ACHD] had done a little investigation, maybe it would have turned out
differently." TT 4046:21-23.

•

"[M]aybe [the project engineer] didn't pay attention." TT 4047:3.

•

"ACHD was so unconcerned that they got no evidence of the condition of the wall and
almost no evidence of what they did on the project." TT 4047:20-23.

•

ACHD "never sent a single person out there to look at it before the project." TT
4047:23-24.

•

ACHD "never told the project inspector or the contractor to be careful of the wall." TT
404 7: 24-4048: 1.

•

ACHD "kept almost no construction logs." TT 4048: 1-2.

•

ACHD "took no photos during construction." TT 4048:2-3.

•

ACHD "kept no compaction logs, which is very weird, especially when there's
compaction issues throughout the project." TT 4048:3-5.

•

ACHD "kept no record of the equipment on the job." TT 4048:5-6.
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had a single person inspect during construction or

4048:6-

8.

Examples of Brooke View's Statements Post-trial:
•

"ACHD could have, and should have, done a pre-construction survey and considered
moving the storm drain and not compacting the sidewalks to be installed (flowable
backfill doesn't require compaction)." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have considered the applicable National Transportation guidelines and
AASHTO guidelines regarding anticipated vibration from construction." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have taken soil samples." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have kept construction logs." CR 5063.

•

ACHD should have "documented the equipment used." CR 5063.

•

"ACHD should have kept compaction logs." CR 5064.

•

"ACHD should have put the contractor on notice of the concern about the walls." CR
5064.

•

"ACHD should have considered mitigation measures like trenching." CR 5064.

On appeal, Brooke View Continues to Assert ACHD's Failures:
•

"[T]ypically storm drains are ten feet from anything with a structural foundation."
Resp. Br. at 2.

•

"The problem is that they were installed so close to existing structures (the walls) that
those nearby structures were physically damaged." Id. at 27.

•

"No one from ACHD ever inspected the walls or performed any kind of preconstruction
survey prior to the lawsuit, prior to construction, or even during construction of the
project." Id. at 3.

•

"ACHD did not do any soil tests adjacent to Brooke View prior to construction."
Id. at 3.

•

ACHD did not "obtain any information about the structural composition of the wall."
Id.at 3.

•

ACHD did not "evaluate the impacts of anticipated construction activities on the
walls." Id. at 3.
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•

"ACHD did not consult the available data in transportation publications which
estimated the vibrations of construction equipment and the threshold of vibration
known to cause damage to nearby structures, although the information was readily
available to them." Id. at 3.

•

"ACHD did not revise the project plans to indicate the walls needed to be retained and
protected during construction." Id. at 3.

•

"ACHD did not specify an particular equipment for the contractor to use on the
project." Id. at 3.

•

ACHD "did not consider moving the storm drain, or using a mitigation trench to
mitigate the impacts of vibration from the construction." Id. at 3-4.

•

"ACHD's construction logs only document that someone from ACHD was on site at
Brooke View seven days" during construction. Id. at 4.

•

"Neither ACHD nor its contactors ever inspected the walls during construction of the
project." Id. at 4.

•

"ACHD did not require its contractor to keep construction logs." Id. at 4.

•

ACHD did not require its contractor to keep "a record of the equipment used." Id. at 4.

•

ACHD did not require its contractor to keep "compaction logs for compaction that was
done along the walls." Id. at 4.

•

"ACHD took no photographs and did no vibration monitoring during the project."
Id. at 4.

•

"ACHD did substantial excavation close to both walls." Id. at 4.

•

ACHD did not consider "using flowable backfill so as to avoid having to compact for
the sidewalk just feet from the walls." Id. at 4.

•

ACHD did "compaction not only for trenches, but for sidewalks all along both walls
using a variety of heavy equipment." Id. at 4-5.

•

"ACHD elected to document almost nothing about construction of its improvement
project." Id. at 5.

•

"ACHD had ready access to transportation publications which contain estimates of
peak particle velocities of typical equipment used on an improvement project like this
one." Id. at 24.

•

It had "soils data for soil types like at Brooke View, and tables that set forth the levels
of peak particle velocity that can cause damages to structures like the walls." Id. at 24.
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•

"These simple, easy to make calculations would
shown damage to the walls could
expected from construction per the project plans as proposed." Id. at 24.

•

"ACHD Policy also adopted criteria that recommends a preconstruction survey be
done, which would have analyzed potential impacts to the walls and ways to avoid
those impacts." Id. at 25.

•

"ACHD could have made choices which would have avoided causing such damage"
Id. at 27.
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